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1 As its title suggests, Ruth Levitas’s The Concept of Utopia—published originally in 1990 and
republished this year in the “Ralahine Classics” series—is a study principally concerned
with the definition of its object. Though this is rather unusual as the objective of a book-
length study in more established fields of inquiry in the humanities, it is less so in utopian
studies, where the desire to defend the scholarly dignity of one’s preoccupations from the
Scylla of mass media trivialization and the Charybdis of scholarly disrepute has made
rigorous definition a priority. 
2 The book’s purpose is essentially twofold: first, it undertakes to summarize, in more or
less chronological order, a variety of influential definitions—implicit and explicit—of the
concept of utopia. This is not an effort to resolve the problem of definition by illustrating
the existence of a hidden consensus, however; rather, Levitas is concerned to highlight
zones of divergence and disagreement, showing that they follow from decisions to focus
on different aspects of the concept (principally,  on form, function and content).   The
second goal of the book, one pursued explicitly only in its last chapter, is to propose a
new, and in the author’s view more flexible and less problematically exclusive, definition
of the concept of utopia. For Levitas, this new definition would allow us “to include the
utopian aspects of a wide range of cultural forms and behaviors,” while exploring “the
ways in which form, function and content interact and are conditioned by the social
context of utopia” (222).
3 The structure of  the book is  accordingly both bifocal  and asymmetrical:  chapter one
briefly examines the covert definitions of utopia in some of the early studies of the field—
ones published between 1879 and 1952.  Chapter two—on Marx and Engels—shifts the
focus  from  literary  history  and  the  history  of  ideas  to  sociology,  and  thus  also  to
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definitions  of  utopia  principally  concerned  with  function  rather  than  with  form  or
content. More interesting—because rarely discussed elsewhere—is chapter three which
examines  the  pejorative  conception  of  “utopia”  in  Georges  Sorel  (particularly  in
Reflections on Violence) in juxtaposition with its affirmative meaning in Karl Mannheim’s
well-known essay on “Ideology and Utopia”. Chapter four turns to the greatly influential
approach of Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope, originally published in 1955-1959, but only
made available in English a few years before the publication of Levitas’s book, in 1986.
Levitas views Bloch as the principal advocate of the methodological rejection of form as
the defining aspect of utopia and focuses on the ways in which Bloch attempts to shift
focus to the rich variety of utopia’s contents (from mere daydreaming to the concrete
utopia  of  Marxism)  and  functions  (cognition  of  the  present,  anticipation  of  change,
education of the desire for social transformation). 
4 This  last  function—-the  treatment  of  desire  as  an  educable,  intentionally  shapeable
dimension of psychic life—comes unto its own as a subject in chapter 5, which is arguably
the pivotal chapter in the book. The chapter focuses on the “rediscovery” of William
Morris as a figure whose literary and essayistic work bridges utopianism and Marxism
without sacrificing the former to doctrinaire orthodoxy but also without bypassing the
need  for  engagement  with  real  social  relations  and  their  transformation  through
collective action. Levitas usefully excavates the history of Morris’s reception in Marxist
circles, from Robin Page Arnot’s reclamation of Morris for orthodox Marxism in the 1930s
to Morris’s positive reappraisal as a properly Marxian utopist in A.L Morton’s The English
Utopia, to the hermeneutic “claims and counterclaims” that emerge in E.P. Thompson’s
detailed study of Morris as a mediator between the otherwise disjointed traditions of
Romanticism and Marxist humanism, but also in the diverging French interventions of
Paul Meir and Miguel Abensour and in Perry Anderson’s reflexive appraisal of Morris’s
place in the rethinking of the relationship between Marxism, Romanticism and utopia.
Chapter six continues the investigation of the concept of utopian desire by revisiting
Herbert Marcuse’s effort to think through the import of Freudian psychoanalysis for a
theory  of  the  function  of  the  utopian  impulse  as  counterweight  to  the  combined
pressures  of  the so-called “performance principle” and the establishment-propagated
pleasures of “repressive desublimation”. Chapter seven, which closes this long genealogy
of  sociological  conceptions  of  the  function  of  utopia,  visits  more  recent  forays  into
definition, from J.C Davis’s typology of forms of the “ideal society” as forms of negotiating
social scarcity, to Zygmunt Bauman’s insistence on the historical fatality of the modern
link between utopianism and socialism, to Tom Moylan’s exploration of the category of
“critical  utopia”  as  an  instance  of  interplay  between  changes  in  form  and  the
transformation of ideological functions.
5 The book’s last chapter then undertakes both a critical summation of the approaches that
have been outlined and a series of propositions that concern the re-theorization of the
concept of utopia beyond the limits located in past theories. Levitas concludes a) that
“narrow  definitions”  of  utopia  “in  terms  of  content  or  form  or  function  are  all
undesirable”; and b) that “any definition must be able to incorporate a wide range of
forms,  functions and contents” (207).  This new definition involves the predication of
utopia on a notion of  desire—“the desire for  a  different,  better  way of  being” (209).
Levitas sees desire as a far more inclusive dimension that what it is frequently associated
with—hope—since the former does by no means necessarily entail hope in realisability
and thus includes visions that are not meant to be taken as capable of materialization,
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from the Land of Cockaygne to millennial visions of a state of things brought about by
divine intervention, to utopian visions of an ideal world located in another, unlocatable
space rather than in the impending future. In addition, Levitas privileges desire for a
“better way of being” over that for an alternative world of social arrangements because
for her “the pursuit of a better way of being does not always involve the alteration of
external conditions” (221). A number of consequences follows: first, the rejection of the
existence of anything like “universal utopia,” since “needs are differently perceived by
different observers” and since “needs actually do vary between societies” (213); secondly,
and as a consequence of this first consequence, the rejection of any definition of utopia
that privileges a determinate ideational content; and finally, the rejection of the idea—
central in much utopian theorizing from Bloch to Mannheim or Marcuse—that “utopia is
both oppositional and transformative” (212). For Levitas, there is no deterministic link
between utopian desire and social change, since “the transformation of reality and the
realization of  utopia depend […] upon not only wishful  thinking but will-full  action”
(230-31).
6 Principal  among  the  strengths  of  Levitas’s  book  is  its  tough-mindedness  regarding
frequently unquestioned and unreflective assumptions about the relationship between
the  social  dreaming  involved  in  utopia  and the  possibilities  of  transformative  social
action. This seems to me particularly welcome, given the tendency of many literature-
focused studies to assume a kind of transcendental efficacy in the formal qualities of a
text and to overlook the multifold complexities of mediation between text and social
context.  Such  tough-mindedness  also  has  the  virtue  of  allowing  Levitas  to  argue
convincingly  and compellingly  against  the  frequently  unexamined assumption of  the
waning  of  utopia,  showing  that  the  neoconservative  and  neoliberal  visions  that
dominated western society throughout the 1980s (and 90s) can be rigorously defined as
utopian, to the extent that they fully express a desire for a different way of being—one
that, in addition, its exponents did view as better and as more fulfilling for the individual
than the one offered by socialism or by the Keynesian welfare state.
7 But the book also seems to me to exhibit a number of weaknesses: the first is largely
compositional, and  concerns  what  I  described  earlier  as  the  book’s  “asymmetrical”
structure. It is not always clear to the reader why it is necessary to undertake a long and
detailed examination of frequently well-known positions (for instance Marx and Engels’s,
or Bloch’s) in order to arrive at the propositions of the last chapter. The exercise seems
frequently repetitive, especially as Levitas returns to the criteriological triptych of form-
function-content in almost every chapter, forcing a conceptual formalism on texts that
do not always warrant it, often with rather reductive results. Given the highly interesting
and  challenging  nature  of  the  last  chapter,  one  would  wish  for  a  different  kind  of
presentation, one that would more organically interlace the author’s own concerns and
methodological counterclaims with the critical reading of the tradition.
8 The second important weakness is one Levitas herself comments on in her new preface,
and concerns the theoretical status of her key definitional term, that of (utopian) desire.
Levitas  argues  that  readers  of  the  book  have  been  puzzled  by  the  term,  “wrongly
assuming a Lacanian reference” (xiii-xiv), but it is quite unclear what the appropriate
theoretical ground for the concept actually is. Bloch’s attempt to construct a theory of
the “utopian impulse” is, as the author herself remarks, based on the assumption of a
realm  of  consciousness—the  “not  yet  conscious”—which  has  a  drastically  different
character than that of the essentially regressive unconscious, but this supposition has
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had no theoretical impact within psychoanalysis and arguably lacks any experimental or
clinical support. Marcuse’s own brand of Freudo-Marxism is one that has come under
severe  attack  from  orthodox  psychoanalysis,  which  has  accused  it  of  a  crude  and
reductive confusion of the categories of desire, demand and need, and of ignorance of
Freud’s  metapsychological  theory  of  drives1 (as  Žižek  has  frequently  remarked,  for
instance, Freud’s death drive has very little to do with Marcuse’s Thanatos or the so-called
“nirvana principle”)2. Levitas herself seems to conflate desire and need in a number of
instances, as when she speaks of a desire “for the effortless gratification of need” (220) or
when  she  treats  “educating  desire”  and  “defining  needs”  (223)  as  interchangeable
formulations  of  the  function of  utopia.  The  very  idea  of  an “education of desire”  is
inadmissible from a psychoanalytic perspective, which would, if anything, speak of the
possibility  of  a  manipulation  of  desire  through  the  provision  of  endless  stand-ins  or
substitutions  for  its  always  lacking object  (as  in  advertising);  or,  alternatively,  of  an
education through desire, to the extent that the rallying cry of Lacanian ethics is not
giving up on one’s desire3—which is to say, of traversing the fantasy that desire may be
fulfilled, of overcoming the compensatory and regressive satisfactions of the Imaginary
for the sake of confrontation with the traumatic but also liberating core of the Real.
9 It is impossible to bypass such objections effectively by simply remarking that “Lacanian
psychoanalysis  makes  me lose  the  will  to  live” (xiv).  One would rather  need a  fully
developed alternative theory of desire that somehow does away with the structuring,
ineradicable  role  of  lack,  including  the  lack  in  the  Other  who,  according  to  Lacan,
constitutes the locus of the subject’s desire. In the absence of such a theory, Levitas’s call
for  redefinition seems to  stand on rather  unsafe  ground.  What  Fredric  Jameson has
termed “the desire called Utopia”4 may be a useful heuristic schema, but it seems to me to
refer less to an expression of desire pure and simple than to the result of a complex
negotiation between desire and conscious political will, one that largely consists in an
attempt to tether the former to the latter, to find ways through which the spontaneous
expression of the former can be managed so as to benefit the goals defined by the latter,
thus rendering the socially useful individually pleasurable and vice versa (Fourier seems
to me the exemplary investigator of this mechanism). But one must also concede that this
hardly seems to be exclusively the business of utopia, since the social management or
“education” of the libidinal, far from being an adequate ground for the definition of the
term, is no less the purview of utopia’s dialectical complement, which is to say of our old
friend ideology.
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